Ambassador Oshima 3.ao.0003 Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

Singapore as the focal point. Australian troops and modern airplanes were being sent. Branches of the Ministry of Economic War and Propaganda were established in Singapore, Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire while health corps and transportation groups were organized from the British resident in the city, to serve behind the lines in the event of war. Yet, though British defense measures appeared to be approaching fulfillment, the available sea power in that area was still inadequate and provided the British with a source of constant concern.[1067]

However, with the arrival of Sir Alfred Duff-Cooper in October 1941 it was expected that the British defense organization would coordinate its activities.[1068] Since he was accompanied by a large staff, including Colonel Edmund Leo Hall-Patch, Sir David John Montague Douglas, Scott, Chambers, and Lieutenant Commander Neville, the British official's mission seemed to be associated with the administration of foreign affairs in the Far East. In a conference with United States and British officials including Major General Francis Stewart Gilderoy Piggott, British Military Attache in Tokyo, and Mr. Becker, a lawyer, the effectiveness of allied propaganda upon the Japanese and the Nanking governments was to be discussed with the aim of divorcing Japan from the Axis powers.[1069]

430. Japan Exchanges Merchandise with Spain

Toward the end of October as the need for maintaining the proper balance of trade became acute, Japan extended the rise of barter in its transactions, to Spain and Portugal. On October 15, 1941 Tokyo informed London that arrangement had been made for using the Asama Maru in the barter exchange of Japanese merchandise for Spanish quicksilver. Although the business transactions with both Spain and Portugal were concluded primarily between the Mitsui Trading Company and the Spanish Department of Commerce, since they concerned neutral countries within the British sphere of influence, the plans dealing with the transportation of this cargo by the Asama Maru were communicated to the British Ambassador Craigie in Tokyo.[1070]

431. Tokyo Arranges Disposal of Japanese Bonds

Next, in order to dispose of those Japanese bonds backed by foreign money and owned by Japanese residents in England, the Japanese Finance Ministry ordered that a list be drawn up and approved to facilitate either the redeeming or cancellation of those bonds. To deal with those bonds which were not disposed of in this manner Tokyo ordered its Embassy in England on October 16, 1941 to have the London Branch of the Yokohama Specie Bank cancel them. For the cancellation of other bonds in the future, Tokyo further suggested that a list be drawn up regarding the bonds on hand, that it be checked, and finally that one copy be submitted to the Finance Ministry in Japan.[1071]

[1067] Ibid.
[1068] III, 797.
[1069] Ibid.
[1070] III, 798.
[1071] III, 799.

[219] [220 blank]

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

PART C—JAPANESE DIPLOMATIC ACTIVITIES THROUGHOUT THE WORLD

(g) Japanese-German Relations

432. Hitler Stops German-Vichy Conversations

In a wire to Ambassador Oshima dated August 6, 1941 Foreign Minister Toyoda attempted to clarify rumors resulting from statements made by Ambassador Fernand de Brinon in Paris the previous day. The Foreign Minister relayed remarks accredited to Ambassador Brinon by the Spanish ambassador to Japan who had had confidential conversations with Mr. Brinon.

Germany, in exchange for granting Tripoli to France, had demanded the leasing of the Bizerte harbor, according to the reported remarks of the French Ambassador. France refused to grant them. In conversations between Chancellor Adolf Hitler and Vice-Premier Jean Francois Darlan conducted at Berchtesgaden as a prelude to a separate German-French peace, Hitler had shown disappointment and had ordered Ambassador Otto Heinrich Abetz in Paris to discontinue conversations with the Vichy government.[1072]

A meeting between Hitler and Vice-Premier Darlan had occurred on May 11, 1941, at which time Hitler declared that the time had come for France and Germany to draw more closely together. As a token of his good will, the Fuehrer offered, in exchange for certain concessions, the repatriation of 100,000 French war prisoners, officers and non-coms, who had also served in World War I.

In deference to French military pride, Hitler offered Darlan the right to organize a skeleton air force; in deference to prostrate French finances, he agreed to review the arrangement whereby Vichy paid $8,000,000 a day for the upkeep of the army of occupation. In practice, Hitler did send home the veteran prisoners; a few French army planes were reconditioned and placed in service, but the sum extracted for the army in France remained unchanged. For his part Hitler demanded access to military supplies in the colonies, assistance to Nazi bases, and employment of the fleet by the French for convoying food ships and other patrol duties. The last condition was, of course, designed to bring the French Fleet into conflict with the British. The Nazi demands, it will be seen, corresponded closely to, and exceeded somewhat, those accepted by Pierre Laval at Montoire. Should the Vichy government refuse these reasonable terms, Vice-Premier Darlan was warned, Hitler could not answer for the consequences.[1073]

433. Foreign Minister Toyoda Reviews Japan's Policies

After a conference with the military leaders of Japan, Foreign Minister Teijiro Toyoda on July 31, 1941 dispatched the Imperial government's policy regarding the Russo-German war to the Japanese Ambassadors in Berlin, Rome, and Washington. The broad outlines of Japan's future policy were decided in a Cabinet meeting on July 2, the Foreign Minister wired, and every effort was now being expended to bring about its materialization.[1074]

Despite the fact that German diplomatic officials in Tokyo understood Japan's position, the Nazi government had not been sufficiently informed, Foreign Minister Toyoda continued. After having devoted the greater part of its energies for four years to bring a conclusion to the China incident, Japan found itself with large forces still fighting on the China mainland and new difficulties arising in the north and south. Commercial and economic relations between Japan and third countries, led by the United States and England, had become so strained that Japan was forced to secure the raw materials from the South Seas. This situation had resulted

[1072] III, 800.
[1073] "How War Came," by Forrest Davis and Earnst K. Lindley, Simon and Schuster, New York, 1942; pp. 222-223.
[1074] III, 801.

[221]

in the decision to obtain military bases in French Indo-China. Meanwhile the Russo-German war offered an opportunity to settle the northern question after preparations had been completed.

The Foreign Minister pointed out that Japanese advances to the south obviously had given England, Russia, and the United States a set-back in the Pacific, thus helping Germany.

German annoyance at Japan's negotiations with the United States was realized in the Home Office; however, two of the primary objectives of Japan were to prevent the United States from entering the war "at any cost" and to settle the Chinese incident. Having assumed that there was complete trust between Germany and Japan, Foreign Minister Toyoda said that the discussions with the United States were begun at a time which seemed opportune to Japan. He referred to the fact that Germany initiated the war with the Soviet Union at an undesirable moment for Japan.

Pointing to the promulgation of an Imperial rescript as proof of Japan's determination to effect the success of the objectives of the Tripartite Pact, Foreign Minister Toyoda reiterated that each country must have a certain flexibility in its conduct if these aims were to be accomplished. He explained that real cooperation did not necessarily mean complete symmetry of action but rather a trust in each other, thereby enabling both Japan and Germany to strive toward the common goal, each using its own discretion within the bounds of good judgment.[1075]

434. Ambassador Oshima Correlates German-Russian Battle Reports

Rumors that the German army was not succeeding in its drive against Russia prompted Ambassador Hiroshi Oshima on August 6, 1941 to correlate public statements from both belligerents in an attempt to clarify the situation. From these reports he surmised that Russian forces had been irreparably damaged with casualties mounting to 3,500,000. Transfers of troops from Siberia and other sections of the U.S.S.R. to revitalize the Red Army were deemed ineffective.

Only Russia's southern Ukrainian forces retained any degree of striking power, according to Ambassador Oshima; Germany was now attacking in this sector as well as cleaning up the area south of Kiev. He commended the excellent strategy of the German army in cautiously encircling the stubborn Soviet troops with minimum losses.[1076]

435. The Foreign Minister Explains That Communication Difficulties Impede the Expression of Tokyo's War Aims

Recently-appointed Foreign Minister Admiral Teijiro Toyoda replied on August 7, 1941 to Ambassador Oshima's request for clarification of Japanese policy particularly in regard to the Russo-German conflict.[1077] He pointed out that the Foreign Office in Tokyo was experiencing unusual communications difficulties in disseminating European and American intelligence. Therefore, the Home Office was finding it increasingly burdensome to keep its field units informed of the national policy at all times.

The Foreign Minister attempted to convey the beliefs of his office regarding future German plans. He acknowledged the possibilities of a German invasion of England and recognized the fact that, although the Axis seemed bent on an early termination of the war, Germany was preparing for a prolonged conflict. In the light of current British defense preparations and morale, the eventuality of a long war seemed probable.

Concerning the Russo-German war, the Japanese Foreign Office expressed the belief that the Russian people were convinced that Germany was waging a racial war against them. In view of the Russians' deep rooted communistic conviction and traditional affinity for the soil, they

[1075] III, 802-804.
[1076] III, 805.
[1077] II, 600.

[222]

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

would meet the invading armies with unyielding resistance. Japan could not overlook the difficulties of administering such territories when conquered, territories vast in their geography, intense and severe in their climate, and poorly supplied with transportation facilities.

In addition, with the German army progressing at its present slow pace, Tokyo also realized that Commissar Joseph Stalin would be able to retreat to the Ural Mountains, thereby temporarily frustrating the German plan to bring chaos to the Red Regime. Therefore, according to Tokyo, unless the German army were to exhibit a more "blitzlike" advance, the Stalin power would continue to be a dominating influence in the Far East and a menace to Japan.[1078]

436. Ambassador Oshima Again Urges Active Support of Tripartite Pact

Ambassador Oshima on August 9, 1941 directed a dispatch to the Foreign Minister, reiterating his former pleas for active support for the Tripartite Pact. He explained that despite Tokyo's numerous statements advising Germany that the Japanese were conducting their policies in accord with the aims and spirit of the Pact, unless the plans, by which this support was to materialize were forcefully executed in the near future, Japan might give an impression of disinterest. The full fruits of cooperation would not be garnered through individual efforts. Stressing that it was not his intention that Japan should court Germany and Italy, he continued that they should cooperate with a view toward future benefits for the Empire.[1079] Ambassador Oshima explained that Hitler had already offered his support to Japan should a clash occur between that country and the United States.[1080]

437. Ambassador Oshima Reveals German Organization for the Occupation of Russia Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire

On the same day Ambassador Oshima acknowledged that Germany had not devised a course of action beyond the annihilation of the Russian field forces. Germany, however, had set up a governing organization under the head of Dr. Alfred Rosenburg to administer the conquered territories. The proposed policy of destroying Communism at its source coincided unalterably with the intention of the Japanese government, Ambassador Oshima pointed out; and it was only fair, in fact essential, that Japan now cooperate closely and unconditionally with the Axis to insure harmony in the future. As soon as the Japanese Empire had determined its aims and policies, Ambassador Oshima suggested that Japan and Germany negotiate for the settlement of jurisdictional disputes which might arise upon the partitioning of Russian territory.[1081] Ambassador Oshima had previously revealed that Germany planned to take direct control of affairs in conquered Russia for a ten-year period after the occupation, occupying all the area up to the Ural Mountains. Dr. Rosenberg, German-appointed Minister of State for the occupied territory, would establish his office in Moscow.

According to Germany's postwar plan the three Baltic countries and a part of White Russia were to be united to form a Baltic district, and an enlarged Ukraine and the Caucasus would form two other political areas. Finland would receive the Kola peninsula and the Karelian area, while Rumania would recover Bessarabia and Bukovina. Hungary would receive a small area in exchange for the cession of a portion to Slovakia. No change in the former German policy toward Poland was expected.[1082]

438. Rumors of Japanese Representations to U.S.S.R. Reach Germany

A few days later the German Minister at Hsinking was reportedly under the impression that Japan had made representations to the Soviet Union. Although it appeared that Japanese

[1078] III, 806.
[1079] III, 807.
[1080] III, 808.
[1081] III, 809.
[1082] III, 810.

[223]

Home Affairs Department had revealed such information to the Nichi-Nichi main office, but had killed the story immediately, the German official still had had time to intercept it.

439. Ambassador Oshima's Resignation Is Refused

Despite Ambassador Oshima's persistent requests to return to Japan, the Home Office insisted that he remain in Berlin. In a secret dispatch on August 12, 1941 Foreign Minister Toyoda re-emphasized the fact that although the Ambassador's point of view was understood, his presence in Berlin remained a necessity.[1084]

440. The German Army Progresses Against Russia

Ambassador Heinrich D. Stahmer informed the Japanese Ambassador that the German army by August 14 had completely encircled Leningrad and had occupied the northeast area. In the south, Odessa had been invested. The Dnepropetrovsk power plant, largest in Soviet Russia, was to be the next objective of the advancing forces. Ambassador Stahmer divulged the encouraging information to Ambassador Oshima that German losses in the six weeks of war had been unbelievably small with a total dead of only 30,000. Since the Japanese Ambassador had recently concluded a tour of the battlefield, he was convinced that these figures were reasonably accurate.

Russian and British air attacks on Berlin, Ambassador Stahmer declared, were attempting to prove that Germany did not have aerial supremacy. This was only a political move, unrelated to actual conditions. He cautioned Japan to be wary of Russian-British propaganda.[1085]

441. Germany Advises Evacuation of Consular Officials From Occupied Territories

On instruction from the German government all Consular officials in the occupied areas of France, Belgium, Holland, Luxemburg, and Norway were to close their offices by September 1, 1941 and to evacuate the areas. Ambassador Oshima notified the Home Office on August 12 that Minister Paul Schmidt, German Chief of Protocol, had confided to him that this order was not to be applied to Japan.[1086]

On August 16, 1941 Ambassador Oshima reported to Tokyo that he had recently dispatched Consul Shigero Imai to Brussels to bring the Imperial portraits, then in possession of the Antwerp Consulate, to the Berlin office.[1087]

Further arrangements were made on August 23, 1941 for the evacuation of Japanese officials from occupied areas.[1088]

That Japan had instigated a license system applying to foreigners leaving that country was wired to Ambassador Oshima. He was instructed to determine the extent of such restrictions in Germany and other countries to which he was accredited. Since Japan's license system would not effect members of Foreign Embassies, Ministries, Consulates and their families unless such a system were manifested against Japan in other countries, the Ambassador was directed to discover the extent and application of the restrictions.[1089]

442. Manchukuoan-German Trade Retarded by War

As the Russo-German war progressed, increased restrictions upon Japanese-German trade were being felt, but it was difficult for Japanese officials to explain the seriousness of the situation to their Axis partners. One instance of restricted trade to Germany was the forced discontinuance of the Manchukuoan supply of soy beans. It was feared that the mere excuse of a Russo-

[1084] III, 812.
[1085] III, 813.
[1086] III, 814.
[1087] III, 815.
[1088] III, 816.
[1089] III, 817.

[224]

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

German war would seem a feeble pretext to German authorities considering the fact that Germany would probably counter with the argument that Manchukuo need not be concerned with the problem of overland transportation. By August 12, 1941 Japanese spokesman had agreed that they should attempt to convince Germany that since Japan was adopting emergency measures in the North in order to assist Germany, and since there was a limited supply of soy beans for domestic consumption in Manchukuo already, it would be impossible to live up to the May agreement in regard to shipments to Germany.[1090]

By October 8, 1941 considerable Manchurian merchandise amounting to $215,000 which was en route to Germany through Russia had been confiscated. Since Germany would probably never receive the shipments and could not be expected to pay for them, Japan found itself in the position of settling the deal with Manchuria. In an attempt to avoid paying the retail price for the shipments which it had transhipped to Germany, Japan consulted with Ambassador Oshima and Minister Umetsu.[1091]

443. Japan Learns of German Undercover Activities in China

On the other hand, German progress in China did not seem to be suffering since, with the freezing of assets in Tientsin, German firms were reported to be secretly purchasing United States and British real estate. This was distressing Japanese authorities, and it was advised that Japan seek the German government's cooperation either through the German Ambassador or through Dr. Helmut Wohlthat.[1092] Thus, Consul Makoto Okuma on August 18, 1941,[1093] inquired of German authorities regarding the rumored encroachment on Japanese rights in the Tientsin area. In response, German spokesmen declared that they had been giving ample support to Japan's policy of freezing British and American assets. Stating that they had no specific knowledge of any German-Allied dealings, they agreed that should the Japanese submit concrete evidence, such practice would be dealt with properly. In the instance of the German firm of Meruchaasu which was under suspicion, it was revealed that they had already issued a warning.

When Consul Okuma inquired about German-Jewish activities he was reassured that not one of the German firms in this area was Jewish, even though the Jews in that area were socially respected.[1094]

444. Japan Cultivates the Interest of the German People

Despite these somewhat strained relations between merchants in China, the general attitude toward Japan in Germany gradually became one of increasing interest. According to Ambassador Oshima the sudden surge of interest in Japan was giving rise to a demand for materials in the form of German language publications propagandizing Japan. He reported that distribution of effective information concerning Japan was being disseminated through libraries, universities, publishers, government offices, and through the party and picked individuals. The material was nonetheless proving insufficient, and he urged the publication of new and supplementary volumes. Currently popular editions were Nippon, Contemporary Japan, The East Asia Economic and the Japan Trade Monthly.[1095]

445. Ambassador Oshima Admonishes Tokyo for Lack of Decisive Attitude

Ambassador Oshima was becoming increasingly aroused that no definite instructions in regard to Japan's policy in the Russo-German conflict had been forthcoming from Tokyo. On

[1090] III, 818.
[1091] III, 819.
[1092] III, 820.
[1093] III, 821.
[1094] Ibid.
[1096] III, 822.

[225]

August 20, 1941 he transmitted a caustic reminder that no word except an account of Foreign Minister Toyoda's conferences with Ambassadors Constantin Smetanin and Eugene Ott on July 9 had been forthcoming and that it was impossible to know the real intention of the Home Office merely on the basis of such conversations. He also took this opportunity to request immediate information on Japanese-American relations, revealing that the government had become quite perturbed over the existing circumstances.[1096]

In a severe rebuke for the government's failure to inform its field representatives of the current situation, Ambassador Oshima telegraphed that he could not conclude that Foreign Minister Toyoda either feared that secrecy would not be maintained or that the government had not as yet decided upon a definite policy. Should Tokyo be withholding information for security reasons, Ambassador Oshima declared that every Japanese representative at the risk of his life would maintain secrecy. Should the second reason prevail, Ambassador Oshima urged that, regardless of the inconclusiveness of the information, he be told even what Mr. Toyoda himself was considering.[1097]

446. Ambassador Oshima Objects to Japan's Use of Russian News Releases

Ambassador Oshima also complained bitterly of Japan's objective broadcasts of Russo-German frontline activities, stating that Tokyo, on two occasions, August 9 and 10, 1941, had broadcast Tass reports to the effect that Russian planes had raided Berlin on August 7 and 8. Ambassador Oshima pointed out that actually only an air raid alarm had been sounded and that no great damage, such as was reported, had been inflicted.

Stressing the fact that Japan would certainly be equally outraged should Germany deign to broadcast as facts the Chungking government reports, he suggested that Japan attempt to control future broadcasts. He further pointed out that since the German Foreign Office was constructing a large receiving station by which it would be able to listen minutely to broadcasts from the whole world, it would now be most important that Japan exercise caution in her transmissions.[1098]

The Ambassador continued to emphasize the ill will and confused feelings which such a policy of broadcasting would invoke throughout the Empire. This kind of reporting not only would cause misunderstanding among German officials and among Japanese living outside of Berlin, but there was a danger that it would injure the veracity of Japanese overseas broadcasts. Therefore, he urged that the Foreign Office consult with the broadcasting department and take suitable steps regarding the regulating of broadcasting reports originating in Russia.[1099]

447. Foreign Minister Toyoda Upholds Japan's Methods

In rebuke, on August 22, 1941, Foreign Minister Toyoda reminded Mr. Oshima that the Japanese government had been following a policy of handling worldwide broadcasts objectively and impartially in the hope of fostering confidence. He stressed the point that from the very fact that German broadcasts had been so severely regulated, their China and South Seas propaganda power had become worthless.

He also countered that such examples as the Ambassador had pointed out were extremely rare and challenged him to listen over a period of several days to verify this. Substantiating evidence for the report of a Russian raid on Berlin had been garnered from Domei dispatches and had originated in London and Vichy, the Foreign Minister revealed. Again he emphasized

[1096] III, 823.
[1097] III, 824.
[1098] III, 825.
[1099] III, 826.

[226]

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

the fact that the Japanese broadcasting companies, working in unison with all government branches, were completely supporting their Foreign Office policy of upholding the Tripartite agreement.[1100]

448. Ambassador Oshima Confers with Field Marshal Keitel

By August 25, 1941, according to Ambassador Oshima who had been gathering battle reports from various sources[1101] including the German Field Marshal Wilhelm Keitel, with whom he talked on August 23 at General Headquarters,[1102] German strategy was meeting with unprecedented success. In a lengthy six part dispatch transmitted on August 25, 1941, Ambassador Oshima attempted to convey to his Home Office the current trend of Russo-German hostilities, as related to him by the Field Marshal. Accordingly, he revealed that Russian casualties were estimated to be about five million, with a definitely known total of 1,250,000 prisoners and twice that many dead. Only the equivalent of about 60 divisions of the 260 which had appeared on battlefields remained, and these seemed to be haphazardly slapped together, resulting in low military efficiency. It had been estimated that the armed strength of the Soviet Union had fallen to one third of its original strength. The shortage of equipment and officer material was apparent. In some cases sergeants commanded battalions and in others a lieutenant would be in charge of a regiment.

Judging from the population it would be possible to organize about 20 more divisions, but in so doing they would practically exhaust the source of supply. Female battalions had already made an appearance. Although the Russian forces were still rich in manpower, they no longer were equipped or trained to fight with any degree of efficiency.[1103]

On the other hand, in regard to German losses, the Field Marshal stated that casualties were less than 160,000, the dead to date reaching 40,000. War reports from the southern front showed Odessa completely encircled while Dnepropetrovsk, located in a field warfare area and very strongly fortified, was being subjected to artillery fire before German forces would make any direct in-fighting attempt.

It was pointed out that in order to avoid the damage resulting from suburban warfare, Kiev was being subjected to destruction by artillery fire, to be followed up by infantry attacks.

Sudden and rapid developments in the Ukraine sector had enabled the German army to annihilate the greater part of Marshal Semyon Mikhailovich Budenny's forces, Field Marshal Keitel revealed. Because of the speed with which this advance had been conducted, all grains and other goods were left intact. From this point the German forces were scheduled to push on across the Dnieper River to Harikohu and Donbasu.[1104]

Along the northern front the Leningrad-Moscow railroad had already been cut at Chudovo and the German army had laid siege to the outlying districts of Leningrad from which is was reported that Marshall Kliment Voroshilov had fled. In Estonia, Revel remained the only unconquered area. Here again the German forces were avoiding rushing tactics and were concentrating on heavy artillery fire, the Field Marshal explained. The Finnish forces in cooperation with the Germans had advanced to the area between Lake Ladoga and Lake Onega. For the purpose of seizing the Murmansk area, General Eduard Dietl, famed for his defense of Narvik, was reportedly arriving from Norway with his forces via the sea.[1105]

German divisions on the central front had been diverted to both the southern and northern theaters, the latter group reaching a point southeast of Leningrad, and joining forces with the troops in that area.

[1100] III, 827.
[1101] III, 828.
[1102] III, 829.
[1103] III, 830.
[1104] III, 831. (The Kana word Harikohu is believed by United States translators to be Kharkov; and the Kana word Donbasu, to be Rostov.)
[1105] Ibid.

[227]

449. Field Marshal Keitel Explains German's War Aims

Explaining the aims of the German forces, Field Marshal Keitel told Ambassador Oshima that they were preparing to launch the second phase of the war soon. The goal of this phase included the capture of the entire region from Rostov to Moscow and the industrial area around Leningrad. These campaigns should be concluded by early November at which time the Russian field forces would have been destroyed. The Caucasus area was to be seized, but this action might not be initiated until December. No prediction about forces to be sent to the Urals could be made until the completion of the second phase. The Field Marshal blamed any delays on weather conditions and the stubborn resistance of the Russian masses.[1106]

450. Nationalist Chinese in Germany Present a Problem to the Axis

On September 2, 1941, Ambassador Oshima reported that a problem had arisen in connection with Chinese Nationalists in Berlin. Although Li Sheng-Wei had been appointed as Nanking Ambassador to Germany, he was experiencing transportation difficulties and would not be on hand to control the situation in Germany for some time. As a means of meeting the existing emergency Ambassador Oshima suggested that Nanking appoint an honorary consul in Berlin, Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire which appointment would be approved by Tokyo, to deal with these "depraved anti-Japanese rascals".

Ambassador Oshima declared that the plan to establish an honorary consul had been thoroughly approved by the German government. If Nanking wished, Berlin had offered to select several "New Order" advocates to collaborate with Nanking representatives for the improvement of Japanese-Chinese-German relations. Ambassador Oshima requested the Foreign Minister's approval.[1107]

451. Japanese-German Trade Continues Despite Difficulties of War

Japan and Germany continued to rely upon each other for transportation facilities as, according to a September 1 dispatch, German and Italian Ambassadors in Tokyo requested that Japanese ships be made available for transporting Axis documents from Tokyo to South America. Japan had been in agreement provided that Italian airplanes flying between Italy and Rio de Janeiro and Santiago be made available for the transportation of Japanese documents which were secret or confidential in nature.[1108]

Tokyo wired that Ambassador Oshima urge the German Ministry of Finance in Berlin to approve Japan's request to draw from German peso funds in Argentina the equivalent of 7,000,000 yen to apply against Japanese purchases of cowhide. As compensation, Foreign Minister Toyoda explained, Japan was offering petroleum and other goods as well as foreign money. Although the details of the negotiations had been communicated to the German government via its representatives in Tokyo, by September 2, 1941, no action had been forthcoming and two of Japan's ships were already in South American waters prepared to load the cargo.[1109]

In the meantime, the Japanese embassy in Berlin was experiencing difficulties in distinguishing between official and civilian, urgent and non-urgent goods. Twenty-seven thousand tons of freight which was destined for Japan had accumulated, and although instructions from Tokyo stipulated that the goods be divided into four categories with the number of tons in each, Ambassador Oshima was at loss to cope with the matter and requested that hereafter more explicit arrangements be completed in Tokyo.[1110]

[1106] Ibid.
[1107] III, 832.
[1108] III, 833.
[1109] III, 834.
[1110] III, 835.